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ABSTRACT
Text passwords play an important role in protecting the assets of
organisations. Thus, it is of the essence, that employees are well
aware of possible attacks and defences. To that end, we developed
a password security awareness-raising material in a systematic iter-
ative process: The material is based on the literature on password
security, feedback of independent experts, and feedback of lay-users.
It was evaluated in the field with employees of three organisations.
Our results show that the participating employees improved their
abilities to (1) discern secure from insecure password-related be-
haviour in a variety of scenarios relating to different attacks and (2)
assess passwords as secure or insecure. These improved abilities of
the participants were still present in a retention after six months.
Thus, the developed awareness-raising material contributes to im-
proving the password-related security in organisations.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many users face problems when choosing, handling, or remem-
bering their passwords [16, 27, 28], leading to insecure password-
related behaviours. As a result, targeting passwords is the most
prevalent tactic for attacks on organisations: in 2016 [32], 63% of
breaches could be attributed to leveraging weak, default, or stolen
passwords. In 2017 [33], this number was found to have increased
to 81%.
Passwords can get into the hands of attackers in numerous ways,
e.g. they can be guessed, stolen in phishing attacks, eavesdropped
when communication occurs through unsecured channels, or stolen
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when users are observed while entering them. Many users are not
aware how such attacks work and consequently how to defend
against them effectively [27, 31]. Those users are at risk of falling
victim to attacks, which in turn might lead to security breaches in
organisations. When an organisation is affected by a breach, this
can have severe financial consequences: in 2017 the average total
cost of a data breach was found to be $3.62 million [25]. To prevent
such consequences, it is imperative that employees of organisations
understand the attacks targeting passwords and user accounts as
well as the corresponding defences. The prime way to achieve
this are information security awareness-raising materials [14, 35].
They are widely considered to be essential for the resilience of
organisations against information security threats [19, 20]. Yet,
many existing awareness-raising materials on password security
demand from users an impossible task: use only complex passwords,
change them frequently, and never write them down. This kind
of advice is highly problematic for users [16, 27, 28] and does not
represent the current state of the art [21, 37]: awareness-raising
materials must effectively enable users to apply the knowledge
contained within them to their daily lives or the time and effort
spent working through the materials is spent in vain [2].
As core contribution of this work, we address the problem of
making users aware of the different attacks on passwords and user
accounts as well as defences against these attacks. To that end, we
developed an awareness-raising material following an iterative pro-
cess. The initial development of the material was based on research
literature on password security (Section 3.1). It was then refined
incorporating feedback from independent information security ex-
perts from academia and industry (Section 3.2) as well as feedback
from lay-users (Section 3.3). The refined material was then evalu-
ated in the field with employees of three organisations (Section 4).
The results of our evaluation (Section 5) show that the developed
material was not only received very positively and most partici-
pants found it very helpful, but it also contributes to the password-
related security in organisations in two ways. Firstly, it improved
the participating employees’ ability to assess password-related be-
haviour with respect to the attacks described in the material as
secure or insecure. Secondly, the participating employees improved
their ability to assess the security of passwords. In particular, the
results of our retention (Section 6) show that these improvements
remain even six months after the participants have read through
the material. From the discussion of our results, we derive some
further refinements (Section 7). In summary, our awareness-raising
material contributes to improving the password security in organi-
sations. The awareness-raising material is freely available online1,
so that users and organisations can easily benefit from it.
1https://secuso.org/passwortsicherheit (in German only)
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2 RELATEDWORK
Information security awareness-raising materials [15] are an im-
portant tool in keeping users and organisations secure. Lin and
Kunnathur [20] developed a theory of end user information secu-
rity competence based a synthesis of information security liter-
ature. Their theory comprises three dimensions: “ethics and per-
ception”, “knowledge and skills”, and “behaviour”. They highlight
information security awareness as vital part of the knowledge and
skills dimension. This is further evidenced by the many studies (e.g.
[7, 10, 18, 23, 26]) having identified the importance of advice and
awareness-raising materials. Also, the literature review of Lebek et
al. [19] identifies information security awareness as antecedent of
attitude toward secure behaviour. Thus, institutions such as NIST
[35] recommend organisations to distribute awareness-raisingmate-
rials among their employees. Some industry standards even require
it from organisations aiming to be compliant with it [24]. However,
it has been found, that existing password advice often contradicts
current research [21, 37]. Zhang-Kennedy et al. [37] present a re-
view of established advice for general-purpose authentication on
the web. They conclude that many existing rules (e.g. to change
passwords frequently) do not represent the current state of art and
propose a new set of password rules to give as advice to users. Mur-
ray and Malone [21] present an analysis of actual password advice
given by different organisations on the Internet and conclude that
the majority of advice contradicts the current state of research.
Due to the importance of awareness-raising materials, research
literature has highlighted several important aspects of their devel-
opment. Bada and Sasse [2] analysed which aspects are involved in
the success and failure of security awareness campaigns. They iden-
tified as precedents to successful awareness materials the relevancy
of the materials for the users and that the advice in the materials
is actionable. Their recommendation is that all awareness-raising
materials should pay great attention to these aspects. Tsohou et al.
[30] add to these recommendations in their review of literature on
cognitive and cultural biases influencing users information secu-
rity perceptions and behaviours. From the reviewed literature they
derive three recommendations for the development of awareness-
raising materials: (1) using positive stimuli and relative frequencies
to overcome affect biases, (2) the design of the material must ac-
commodate for the fact that users tend to rely on the first piece
of information they are provided with, and (3) the material should
emphasise immediate consequences. Another important concept
for the development of awareness-raising materials is intellectual
need (also called problem-solution ordering) as described by Fuller
et al. [12]. It describes the fact that learners are more motivated and
effective at acquiring knowledge, when presented with the problem
before the solution is explained to them. Furthermore, using expert
feedback and behaviour has been identified as an important aspect
in the development of advice for lay-users. Ion et al. [17] compared
expert to non-expert information security behaviour to collect use-
ful information security advice for lay-users. Their study focused
on information security behaviour in general. They found that ex-
pert and non-expert behaviour differ and summarise their findings
by saying that "some promising security advice emerges: (1) install
software updates, (2) use a password manager, and (3) use two-
factor authentication for online accounts." Likewise, Stobert and
Biddle [28] conducted interviews with information security experts
specifically in the context of passwords and user accounts. They
find that non-experts are in need of consistent strategies to better
protect themselves and that the adoption of password managers
could help non-experts to manage their passwords more securely.
Focusing on the creation of concrete password security awareness-
raising materials, Zhang-Kennedy et al. [36] developed three info-
graphic posters and an online educational comic. They evaluated
the posters against a text condition - “the Wikipedia description of
how password cracking works” - and found that the posters with
explanatory graphics were more effective in the knowledge transfer
than the textual Wikipedia description, underlining the importance
of graphical elements in awareness-raising materials.
3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE
AWARENESS-RAISING MATERIAL
The goal of this work is to create an awareness-raising material
describing possible attacks on passwords and user accounts as well
as effective defences against the attacks. For the development of
our awareness material we applied the recommendations of the
research literature outlined in the last section.
Awareness-raising materials exist in a variety of formats [29],
e.g. instructor-based, computer-based, and text-based. Each format
offers different advantages and disadvantages. In this work, we
focus on text-based awareness-raising materials. They allow self-
paced learning, where the employees can choose the time and
location of their convenience to engage in the awareness-raising
materials and they can easily accommodate for reasonable break-
points [22].
For the development of the awareness-raising material, we em-
ployed a process with three iterations. The initial iteration of the
awareness-raising material was based on the literature on pass-
word security and focused on the aggregation of relevant content.
This in particular addresses the detachment of password advice
and current research literature described by Murray and Malone
[21] as well as Zhang-Kennedy et al. [37]. The second iteration
incorporated feedback gathered from experts from academia and
industry. It focused on the correctness and completeness of the
material’s content. The third iteration added visual elements and
incorporated the informal feedback of lay-users. It focused on the
appeal and understandability of the material.
3.1 First Iteration - Based on Literature
The first step in the development of the awareness-raising material
was the identification of relevant content. When preparing the
content for the awareness-raising material, we followed the first
recommendation of Tsohou et al. [30], i.e. we used positive phrasing
and relative frequencies whenever possible. In addition, since our
awareness-raising material specifically targets lay-users, we used
non-technical terms wherever possible.
We decided to add two introductory sections giving the users
a short overview of (1) who might attack them and where attacks
can be targeted at and (2) the possible consequences of successful
attacks. The latter is thereby intended to addresses the third recom-
mendation of Tsohou et al. [30]. However, we carefully balanced this
recommendation with the first, focusing in our awareness-material
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on the positive phrasing instead of risk and fear. Thereafter, the
description of the actual attacks and defences follow. Following
the recommendations of Bada and Sasse [2] we strongly focused
on relevant attacks on passwords and user accounts as well as ac-
tionable defences against them. The selection of attacks is based
on the detailed comparative analysis of a variety of authentication
schemes by Bonneau et al. [5]. In their analysis, they compare the
authentication schemes’ security based on eleven so-called security
benefits and the corresponding attacks. In addition to the attacks
in [5], we considered the exploitation of reset-mechanisms. This
attack is highly relevant, since commonly used reset-mechanisms
such as “personal security questions” have been shown to offer low
security [4]. The defences are based on the literature on password
security and included in particular the recommendations identified
as important advice, e.g. by Ion et al. [17] to use password managers
and two-factor authentication (cf. section 2).
The attacks in the work of Bonneau et al. [5] do not follow a
systematic order. For our awareness-raising material, we ordered
them in "ascending distance from the user", i.e. first attacks on the
users themselves, then on the users’ devices, then the communica-
tion between the devices and remote services, etc. The description
of each attack was divided into three parts: a description of the
attack, a description of the defences, and further hints. Thereby, we
address the second recommendation of Tsohou et al. [30] by giving
the most important information on each attack and defence strategy
first. The dedicated further hints-section comes last and includes
only information that we anticipate to be relevant or interesting
for few users (e.g. hints for specific software).
The included types of attacks are: (a) Attacks targeted directly
at the users and their interaction with their devices, e.g. based on
fraudulent messages or shoulder surfing; (b) attacks targeted at
the user’s device through malware; (c) attacks targeted at compro-
mising the communication between the users’ devices and remote
services; (d) attacks targeted at the devices and remote services
(e.g. servers of a website), i.e. insecurely store passwords on users’
devices and guessing attacks; and (e) attacks targeted at remote
services (e.g. servers of a website). Beside the aforementioned two
technologies, i.e. password managers and two-factor authentication,
the awareness-raising material included also descriptions of the
technologies: fingerprint readers, graphical passwords, hardware
tokens, privacy filters, and single-sign-on. For a detailed overview
of the awareness-raising material’s content, i.e. all included attacks
and technologies, see appendix A.
3.2 Second Iteration - Incorporation of
Structured Expert Feedback
To improve the initial version of the awareness-raising material,
we iterated its development based on a round of structured ex-
pert feedback. The goal of this second iteration was to ensure the
awareness-raising material’s completeness (i.e. aspects that would
be relevant to users in the organisational and the private context)
and correctness (i.e. no errors or unclear descriptions leading to
the perception of errors in the content) from an information secu-
rity point of view. For this purpose, we created a PDF-file of the
awareness-raising material with a dedicated feedback page inserted
after each of the two introductory sections as well as after the
descriptions of each attack. Each feedback page had two free text
questions asking (a) if the expert felt that any aspects would be
missing from the description of the attack, and (b) if the expert
thought that the description of the attack should be altered to be
clearer. We contacted 30 independent information security experts
from academia and from industry (researchers, information secu-
rity consultants, etc.) and sent them the awareness-raising material
with instructions to give feedback on each section. The experts
were contacted based on their expertise in the password security
domain and their expertise in the context of SMEs. Only German
native-speakers were contacted, since our awareness-raising mate-
rials were created in German. From the 30 experts we contacted,
13 sent us their feedback. We received responses from three re-
searchers, four IT security consultants, three IT administrators,
two people working in the IT security department of their compa-
nies, and one person working in a company testing and developing
security solutions. Thus, we received feedback from a diverse set
of experts. In the following, we outline the major improvements to
the awareness-raising material derived from the feedback.
3.2.1 More detailed information about possible consequences.
Due to the focus on positive phrasing, the the first iteration of the
awareness-raising material comprised only relatively few, but broad
examples of possible consequences. All experts noted that more
concrete examples would be beneficial. Therefore, we adjusted the
focus on positive phrasing based on the structured expert feedback
and expanded the respective introductory section with concrete
examples of consequences of breaches for different attacks and
types of user accounts (e.g. banking, email, social networks, etc.).
Also, we used the expert feedback to improve the phrasing of the
consequences to target more specifically employees of SMEs.
3.2.2 Split of the attacks on network communication. The ma-
jority of experts felt that the section on attacking the network
communication would benefit from a split in two sections: one
covering attacking unencrypted communication and one covering
attacking encrypted communication. Therefore, we split up the
section accordingly into one attack named "Eavesdropping on un-
encrypted communication" and one attack named "Eavesdropping
on encrypted communication". Note that for these two attacks the
wording was improved based on the expert feedback as well, re-
placing the term "compromising" with "eavesdropping" since it was
frequently mentioned the term might be better suited for lay-users.
3.2.3 The aspect of physical access in order to compromise de-
vices. Several experts noted that the description on how devices
can be compromised should not only focus on malware, but also
include physical access to the devices, e.g. accessing devices directly
or tampering with them, when employees are not in the vicinity
of their devices and the devices are therefore unattended. While
the awareness-raising material already instructed users to set a
password lock on their devices and lock the devices whenever they
leave them unattended, the experts felt further scenarios were of
importance (e.g. access to data on unencrypted hard drives by re-
moving the drives from an unattended device). Consequently, we
reworked the respective section to include these aspects.
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Figure 1: The visual elements in the awareness-raising ma-
terial: (a) the icons signifying different types of content; (b)
an example of the images included for each of the attacks
(here: illustrating the theft of a note of a password). The im-
age intentionally includes different types of attackers.
3.3 Third Iteration - Visual Elements and
Lay-User Feedback
The third iteration focused on the visual appeal and the understand-
ability of the awareness-raising material. We added visual elements
to the material and incorporated qualitative feedback of lay-users
on both, the textual descriptions and the visual elements. To this
end, we met with several lay-users from our university (i.e. secre-
taries, designers, and project coordinators) in our lab, gave them the
awareness-raising material and asked them to point out any aspect
they had problems understanding or found visually unappealing.
With respect to the textual descriptions, only minor changes (e.g.
wording) were necessary. For the visual design, we added dedicated
icons to signify the different types of content: a red skull signifying
the attack description, a blue shield signifying the defence descrip-
tion, and a blue speech bubble with an "i" on it to signify further
hints. Also, images illustrating each of the attacks were added to
the attack’s descriptions. Figure 1 depicts these visual elements.
4 USER STUDY METHODOLOGY
In their review of literature on information security awareness,
Haeussinger and Kranz [14] recommend to evaluate awareness-
raising materials in real work environments. Additionally, small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) seem to be a particularly
interesting target for attackers: 61% of attacks in 2017 occurred
in organisations with under 1000 employees [33]. Therefore, we
decided to conduct our study with 90 lay-users employed in three
different SMEs in their real work environments (30 participants in
each SME). The main goal of this study is to evaluate the effective-
ness of the awareness-raising material in conveying the knowledge
regarding the attacks and defences to the users. In addition, cor-
rectly assessing the security of passwords is a crucial aspect of
password management. Even when relying on password managers,
users in the SME context most often have to choose some passwords
themselves, in particular the master password for their password
manager [37], but also the password for unlocking their worksta-
tion and other uses [16]. Therefore, we also assessed the material’s
effect on the participants’ respective skill. Additionally, we wanted
to gain qualitative feedback from the users with respect to the use-
fulness of the awareness-raising material and the images added
in the third iteration of its development. The study methodology
conforms to all requirements of our university’s ethics commission.
In the following, we explain in detail the hypotheses, procedure,
and questionnaires of our study as well as some important aspects
of the analysis methodology.
4.1 Hypotheses
To evaluate the effectiveness of the awareness-raising material, it
is important to test whether the contained knowledge is action-
able, i.e. the participants know how to behave in a situation of
attack. To that end, typically pre-treatment and post-treatment
questionnaires with the same items are used to measure the differ-
ence in performance of the participants (where the treatment is the
awareness-raising material). Our respective hypothesis is:
H1a : The awareness-raising material significantly increases the
users’ ability to discern secure from insecure password-
related behaviour in different scenarios known to the
participant before reading through the material.
However, a frequent criticism of such evaluations is that the pre-
treatment questionnaire primes the participants with respect to
the treatment. It remains therefore unknown if an improvement
which is measured after the participants have read through the
material can be transferred to new scenarios. Therefore, we decided
to investigate not only whether participants improve their ability
to discern secure from insecure password-related behaviour in
scenarios known from the pre-treatment questionnaire, but to also
include new scenarios to the post-treatment questionnaire. Our
corresponding hypothesis is:
H1b : The awareness-raising material significantly increases the
users’ ability to discern secure from insecure password-
related behaviour in different scenarios unknown to the
participant before reading through the material.
The skill of correctly assessing the security of passwords is essential
to the assessment of behaviour related to password security in the
face of guessing attacks, even when relying on technologies such
as password managers. Our respective hypothesis is:
H2a : The awareness-raising material significantly increases the
users’ ability to correctly assess the security of passwords.
The above hypotheses H1a , H1b , and H2a pertain to the effect of
the awareness-raising material observed directly after the treat-
ment. In addition to this direct effect, it is important that the ef-
fect of the awareness-raising material does not decline even after
longer periods of time, since companies will usually distribute
awareness-raising material not continuously, but rather in intervals
(e.g. annually, biannually, or quarterly). Therefore, we decided to
also investigate the effects of the awareness raising material in a
retention after six months. The respective hypotheses are
H1c : The awareness-raising material significantly increases the
users’ ability to discern secure from insecure password-
related behaviour in different scenarios known to the
participant before reading through the material even six
months after reading it.
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Treatment
H2
H1
Pre-Treatment Questionnaire
(employees from three SMEs)
Post-Treatment Questionnaire
(employees from three SMEs)
Significant diﬀerence expected
6 Months
H2
H1
Retention Questionnaire
(employees from one SME)
H1a
H1b
H1c
H1d
H2a
H2b
Pre-1: Assessing behaviour in 11 scenarios as 
secure or insecure 
(selection of 11 out of 22 and order randomised)
Post-1a: Assessing behaviour in 11 scenarios as 
secure or insecure 
(same 11 as in pre-treatment, order randomised 
and interleaved with Post-1b)
Post-1b: Assessing behaviour in 11 scenarios 
as secure or insecure 
(remaining 11 not shown in pre-treatment, order 
randomised and interleaved with Post-1a)
Retention-1a: Assessing behaviour in 11 
scenarios as secure or insecure 
(same 11 as in pre-treatment, order randomised 
and interleaved with Retention-1b)
Retention-1b: Assessing behaviour in 11 
scenarios as secure or insecure 
(remaining 11 not shown in pre-treatment, order 
randomised and interleaved with Retention-1a)
Retention-2: Rating security of 12 passwords
(order randomised)
Post-2: Rating security of 12 passwords
(order randomised)
Pre-2: Rating security of 12 passwords
(order randomised)
Figure 2: Overview of the study design with respect to the hypotheses in our analysis. Note that H1a , H1b , and H2a pertain to
the data collected from the participating employees of all three SMEs. Since only one SME participated in the retention after
six months, H1c , H1d , and H2b pertain only to the data collected from the participating employees from that one SME.
H1d : The awareness-raising material significantly increases the
users’ ability to discern secure from insecure password-
related behaviour in different scenarios unknown to the
participant before reading through the material even six
months after reading it.
H2b : The awareness-raising material significantly increases the
users’ ability to correctly assess the security of passwords
even six months after reading it.
4.2 Procedure
To investigate the hypotheses outlined in the last section, we em-
ployed a study procedure consisting of four phases: (1) a pre-treatment
questionnaire measuring the baseline for the hypotheses in our par-
ticipant sample; (2) the treatment using the developed awareness-
raising material, (3) a post-treatment questionnaire measuring the
effect of the treatment with respect to the aforementioned hypothe-
ses and gathering the qualitative feedback as well as collecting basic
demographics data, and (4) a retention questionnaire measuring the
effect of the treatment with respect to the aforementioned hypothe-
ses after six months. Figure 2 depicts an overview of these phases
in the context of the hypotheses presented in the last section.
The evaluation was conducted with employees at three SMEs in
Germany. Consequently, we conducted the user study in German,
i.e. the awareness-raising material and the questionnaires were
given to the participants in German. The participants were explic-
itly selected as lay-users with respect to information security and
from a wide range of professions by a contact person in each of the
three organisations. The contact person also sent out and collected
the questionnaires. Using a contact person as intermediary in each
organisation ensured that participants remained anonymous, de-
spite answering the questionnaires in their real work environment.
Participants received the questionnaires and the awareness-raising
material as PDF-files via email one after the other as per the four
phases outlined before (i.e. one PDF-file per phase). The PDF-file in
the fist phase comprised the pre-treatment questionnaire with the
respective instructions (overall 20 pages). The PDF-file in the sec-
ond phase comprised only the awareness-raising material (overall
110 pages). The PDF-file in the third phase comprised the post-
treatment questionnaire with the respective instructions (overall
42 pages). The PDF-file in the fourth phase comprised the retention
questionnaire and the respective instructions (overall 30 pages).
Only upon sending the completed pre-treatment questionnaire, the
participant received the awareness-raisingmaterial with the instruc-
tion to take their time to read it. Once the participants confirmed
that they had read the awareness-raising material, they received the
post-treatment questionnaire. After all participants in an organisa-
tion had completed the post-treatment questionnaires, the contact
person sent the filled-out questionnaires to the authors. Then, after
six months the contact person received the retention questionnaires
for all participants and again sent the filled ones back to us. Only
one of the SMEs agreed to participate in the retention session. This
is further discussed in section 7.
4.3 Questionnaires
In this section, we present the items used in our evaluation. All
items were developed in an iterative process using feedback from
psychologists and from two rounds of pre-tests with lay-users.
For H1a−d 22 scenarios were developed to evaluate the par-
ticipants’ ability to correctly assess specific password-related be-
haviour as secure or insecure. For each of the 11 attacks described
in section 3, two scenarios were developed: one representing secure
behaviour and one representing insecure behaviour. The scenarios
were developed with additional feedback from information security
consultants, in order to increase the real world relevancy of the sce-
narios for SME employees. The scenarios are closely aligned with
the attacks and defences described in the awareness-raising mate-
rial. Thereby, our goal was to create challenges for the participants
that did not simply test the declarative knowledge. Instead, we
created scenarios that required the participant to judge password-
related behaviour aligned to the attacks and defences as secure
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or insecure in the same way they would have to judge their own
behaviour when applying the newly gained knowledge in different
situations of their daily lives. An overview of all 22 scenarios can
be found in table 2 in the appendix at the end of this paper. In
the questionnaires, each scenario was accompanied by two ques-
tions: (1) a binary question where the participants had to indicate
whether they believed the scenario represents secure or insecure
behaviour and (2) an open text question offering the participants
the possibility to justify their decision.
To allow testing H1a−d using the developed scenarios, the pre-
treatment questionnaire comprised only 11 of the 22 scenarios cho-
sen at random for each participant (one for each of the attacks, bal-
anced in terms of secure/insecure behaviour). The post-treatment
questionnaire comprised all 22 scenarios. This allowed us to assess
not only the performance in scenarios known before the treatment,
but also the participants’ ability to transfer the gained knowledge
to new scenarios. The retention questionnaire also included all
22 scenarios. The order of the scenarios was randomised for each
participant in all questionnaires.
ForH2a,b , the participants had to rate 12 passwords according to
their security on a 5-point Likert scale (see Figure 3 on the next page
for the full list). Only the two ends of the scale were labelled as very
insecure and very secure. Of the 12 passwords, seven were chosen
to be guessable within seconds using Hashcat with the best64 and
generated2 rule sets in conjunction with Mark Burnett’s wordlist
[8] which he specifically released for academic research (in the
following "insecure passwords"). The remaining 5 passwords were
chosen using a German diceware list (about 80’000 entries, created
from the German Mozilla Firefox dictionary) to be not guessable
with reasonable effort (in the following "secure passwords"). All 12
passwords were included in all three questionnaires.
With respect to the qualitative feedback, we asked free text
questions regarding four aspects: (1) the relevancy of the included
information (item: "Was the content of the awareness-raising ma-
terial relevant for you?"); (2) additional information the partici-
pants would have hoped for (item: "Which additional information
would you have hoped for in the awareness-raising material?");
(3) helpfulness of the images for understanding the content of the
awareness-raising material (item: "Were the images helpful in un-
derstanding the content of the awareness-raising-material? How
could they be improved?"); and (4) whether the awareness-raising
material will have an effect on how the participants manage their
passwords and, if so, what effect it is (item: "Will the content of
the awareness-raising material influence the way you currently
manage your passwords?"). As demographics, we only collected the
participants’ gender and age. The qualitative questions inquiring
the participants’ opinion on the awareness-raising material’s con-
tent and visual elements (as well as the demographics questions)
were only present in the post-treatment questionnaire.
4.4 Analysis
Due to the fact, that only employees from one SME filled the re-
tention questionnaires, the size of the sample is also reduced to a
third. Therefore, we first present the analysis of the results of the
pre-treatment and post-treatment questionnaires (i.e. H1a,b and
H2a ) in section 5. Thereafter, we present the results of the retention
questionnaires (i.e. H1c,d and H2b ) in section section 6.
For the analyses pertaining to the assessment of behaviour in
scenarios related to password security, the participants responses
were aggregated into ratios of correct responses for each scenario.
Thereby, it is important to note that H1a and H1c are thus based
on a within-subject design: all responses pertaining to scenarios
not seen by the respective participant in the pre-treatment ques-
tionnaire are excluded from the post-treatment questionnaire data
in this analysis. Consequently, paired hypothesis tests are used
in this case. In contrast, the analyses of H1b and H1d are based
on a between-subjects design: the responses in the post-treatment
questionnaire stem solely from participants that have not seen
the respective scenarios in the pre-treatment questionnaire. Con-
sequently, independent sample hypothesis tests are used in this
case. Since our data was not normally distributed we used the non-
parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test for paired samples and the
non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test for independent samples.
We used Bonferroni-Holm-corrected α-levels where appropriate.
Effect sizes are interpreted according to [9] as small (r ≥ 0.10),
medium (r ≥ 0.30) or large (r ≥ 0.50).
5 RESULTS – PRE-TREATMENT AND
POST-TREATMENT QUESTIONNAIRES
In this section, we present the results of our analysis of the data
pertaining to the pre-treatment and post-treatment questionnaires.
Overall 90 employees from three SMEs in Germany filled the pre-
treatment and post-treatment questionnaires. Six participants had
to be excluded from the analysis. Their answers to the free text
questions showed detailed knowledge of information security (e.g.
different encryption algorithms) and therefore raised doubts as
to whether they would qualify as lay-users. Of the remaining 84
participants, 56 were male, 27 were female, and one participant
chose to not answer this question. The participants’ age ranged
from 19 years to 43 years (M: 30.0 years; SD: 5.4 years).
5.1 Assessment of Scenarios
For most scenarios, the participating employees assessed the de-
scribed behaviour correctly in the pre-treatment questionnaire.
Two scenarios (3 and 13) stood out due to large numbers of in-
correct answers. A large portion of the free text answers to these
two scenarios indicated that specific formulations in the scenarios
caused participating employees to misinterpret them. This indicates
methodological problems with the scenarios (as opposed to prob-
lems with the content of the awareness-raising material), which
were not uncovered in the pre-tests. For scenario 3, the majority of
participants perceived a locked drawer at home not as secure stor-
age. For scenario 13, the majority of participants perceived that a
dog’s birthday would not be a secret, despite the scenario explicitly
stating this as fact. Thus, we excluded these two scenarios from the
analysis and only the responses to the remaining 20 scenarios were
considered. An overview of the results is depicted in Figure 3a.
5.1.1 Analysis of H1a . The awareness-raising material leads to
an overall increase in correctly assessed scenarios from 88.2% before
the treatment to 93.3% afterwards, when considering the responses
with respect to the scenarios participants saw before and after the
Systematic Creation Of Awareness-Raising Materials On Password Security ACSAC ’18, December 3–7, 2018, San Juan, PR, USA
Figure 3: Overview of the results from the pre-treatment and post-treatment questionnaires. (a) Overview of the ratios of
correct responses to the scenarios for the pre-treatment and post-treatment questionnaires. (b) The responses on the 5-point
Likert scale with respect to the perceived security. In this chart, the participants’ responses are equalised in terms of correct-
ness: the higher the value, themore correct (i.e. insecure for the easy to guess passwords and secure for the diceware passwords)
is the participants’ assessment.
treatment (Pre-1 and Post-1a in Figure 2). A Wilcoxon signed rank
test shows this increase to be significant (V = 25.5, p = .017).
The effect size r = 0.378 is above .3, i.e. indicates a medium effect.
This indicates that working through the awareness-raising material
leads to a significant improvement in the employees’ ability to
assess behaviour as secure or insecure in scenarios known before
the treatment. Thus, the results of our study support H1a .
5.1.2 Analysis of H1b . Additionally, we investigate whether the
participants can transfer the knowledge gained by reading the
awareness-raising material to scenarios they only saw in the post-
treatment questionnaire. A Wilcoxon rank sum test does not find
a significant difference (W = 134, p = .070) between the portions
of correct responses in the pre-treatment questionnaire and the
responses in the post-treatment questionnaire corresponding to the
scenarios only present in the post-treatment questionnaire (Pre-1
and Post-1b in Figure 2).While the test only closely fails significance,
this result indicates that working through the awareness-raising
material might not improve the employees’ ability to assess infor-
mation security behaviour as secure or insecure in new scenarios
unknown before reading the awareness-raising material. Thus, the
results of our study do not support H1b .
5.2 Password Security Ratings
Figure 3b shows the participants’ ratings of the passwords in the
pre-treatment and the post-treatment questionnaires. We could
only include 81 participants in the analysis regarding H2a , since
three participants did not complete the ratings of all passwords.
5.2.1 Analysis of H2a . After the treatment, the assessment of
all passwords improved, i.e. the insecure passwords were perceived
as insecure by more participants and the secure passwords were
perceived as secure by more participants. A Wilcoxon signed rank
test showed a significant difference between the accumulated Likert
scores of the 81 participants (V = 291, p < .001). The effect size
r = 0.423 is above .3, i.e. a medium effect. Thus, the results of our
study provide supporting evidence with respect to H2a .
In the pre-treatment questionnaire, the security of most of the
insecure passwords was assessed correctly by the participants. In
contrast, the security of the secure passwords was mostly assessed
incorrectly. A Wilcoxon signed rank test showed a significant dif-
ference in the correctness of the assessment between the secure
and insecure passwords (V = 3321, p < .001). The effect size
r = 0.614 indicates a large effect. This difference remains in the
post-treatment questionnaire: aWilcoxon signed rank test showed a
significant difference (V = 3240, p < .001). The effect size r = 0.612
again indicates a large effect.
5.3 Qualitative Results
While most participants answered the qualitative questions, the par-
ticipants’ responses to these questions were very concise. However,
for all four aspects under investigation clear themes emerged.
5.3.1 Relevancy of Included Information. Most participants who
answered the respective free text questions found the content of
the awareness-raising material relevant and helpful (90.6%). Par-
ticipants were unexpectedly explicit with respect to their positive
opinion about the material, e.g.: “It was very helpful. I have learned
a lot!” (P7) and “I believe the [content of the material] is relevant for
everybody in today’s world. I have never seen such good education
materials, all information was very helpful.” (P62).
Three topics were perceived as particularly helpful by the par-
ticipants: (1) the information regarding password composition and
guessing attacks, (2) the informationwith respect to regular changes
of passwords, and (3) the information on password managers. The
most frequently voiced concern (stated by 6 participants) was that
the awareness-raising material was perceived as too long.
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Figure 4: Overview of the results from the pre-treatment and retention-treatment questionnaires (all data only from partici-
pants of SME-r). (a) Overview of the ratios of correct responses to the scenarios for the pre-treatment and retention-treatment
questionnaires. (b) The responses on the 5-point Likert scale with respect to the perceived security. In this chart, the partici-
pants’ responses are equalised in terms of correctness: the higher the value, themore correct (i.e. insecure for the easy to guess
passwords and secure for the diceware passwords) is the participants’ assessment.
5.3.2 Additional Information the Participants Would Have Hoped
For. The most frequently mentioned aspect participants would have
hoped for (20.8% of participants who answered this free text ques-
tion) was more concrete information with respect to password
managers and software which can be used to generate passwords,
e.g.: “Concrete suggestions regarding software which can be used to
generate secure passwords, about good password managers.” (P78).
The participants also would have liked more concrete rules on how
to choose passwords in addition to the composition advice already
present in the awareness-raising material (16.7%).
5.3.3 Helpfulness of the Images. All of the participants found
the images in the awareness-raising material helpful, e.g.: “The
images were very helpful in understanding the [awareness-raising
material’s content].” (P53) and “The images were very helpful.” (P89).
5.3.4 Effect of the Awareness-Raising Material on the Users’ Pass-
word Management. The dominant theme in the answers to this
free text question were password managers. 20.3% of participants
answering this question stated their intention to start using a pass-
word manager in the future instead of their original strategy. In
addition, 61.0% stated to continue using a password manager. An ad-
ditional 9.8% stated to create their passwords differently from now
on (without explicitly specifying in which way). The remaining 8.9%
of participants answering this question stated that the awareness-
raising material would have no impact on their behaviour and did
not mention the use of password managers.
6 RESULTS – RETENTION QUESTIONNAIRES
In this section we present the analysis regarding the hypotheses
H1c,d and H2b based on the data from the retention questionnaires.
Since only one of the three SMEs agreed to participate in the re-
tention after six months, we highlight any differences between
the SME partaking in the retention (SME-r in the following) and
the other two SMEs in order to allow correct interpretation of the
following analyses. Participants who had been excluded from the
analysis of the pre-treatment and post-treatment questionnaires
were also excluded from the analysis of the retention. Overall, the
sample for the retention questionnaire comprised 26 participants.
Of those 26 participants, 16 were male, 9 were female, and one
participant chose to not answer this question. The participants’ age
ranged from 19 years to 43 years (M: 32.2 years; SD: 5.5 years).
6.1 Assessment of Scenarios
For the analysis of the retention we again excluded scenarios 3 and
13, due to their issues outlined in section section 5.1.
6.1.1 Differences of SME-r and the other two SMEs. The em-
ployees of SME-r did not perform significantly different in the
pre-treatment questionnaire than the employees of the other two
SMEs. A Wilcoxon rank sum test does not indicate a significant
difference (W = 151, p = 0.182). This holds for the post-treatment
questionnaire as well, where a Wilcoxon rank sum test also does
not indicate a significant difference (W = 207, p = .856).
6.1.2 Analysis ofH1c . The participants of our retention perform
better in the retention questionnaire than in the pre-treatment ques-
tionnaire with respect to the scenarios seen in the pre-treatment
questionnaire. A Wilcoxon signed rank test indicates a significant
difference (V = 15.5, p = .022) and r = 0.363 indicates a medium
effect for this difference. Thus, the results of our study support H1c .
An overview of the results is depicted in figure 4a.
6.1.3 Analysis of H1d . For the scenarios not seen in the pre-
treatment questionnaire, assessments in the retention improved
as well when compared to the pre-treatment questionnaire. A
Wilcoxon rank sum test indicates a significant difference (W = 125,
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Table 1: Overview of the results of the hypothesis tests
Hypothesis Result Effect Size r
Assessment of Scenarios
H1a supported 0.378 (medium)
H1b not supported -
H1c supported 0.363 (medium)
H1d supported 0.482 (medium)
Password Security Ratings
H2a supported 0.423 (medium)
H2b supported 0.603 (large)
p = .031) and an effect size of r = 0.482 indicates a medium effect.
Thus, the results of our study support H1d .
6.2 Password Security Ratings
Note that we could only include 23 participants in the analysis
regarding H2b , since three of the 26 participants did not complete
the ratings for all passwords.
6.2.1 Differences of SME-r and the other two SMEs. The employ-
ees of SME-r performed worse in the pre-treatment questionnaire
than the employees of the other two SMEs. A Wilcoxon rank sum
test showed a significant difference (W = 405, p = .004). An effect
size of r = 0.484 indicates a medium effect. This difference be-
tween SME-r and the other two SMEs reverses in the post-treatment
questionnaire: the employees of SME-r rate the security of pass-
words more correctly than the employees of the other two SMEs.
A Wilcoxon rank sum test indicates this difference to be signifi-
cant (W = 977.5, p = .002). An effect size of r = 0.484 indicates a
medium effect.
6.2.2 Analysis of H2b . A Wilcoxon rank sum test indicates that
the performance in the pre-treatment questionnaire is significantly
worse than in the retention questionnaire (V = 0, p < .001). An
effect size of r = 0.603 indicates a large effect. Thus, the results of
our study support H2b . An overview of the results is depicted in
figure 4b. Also, a Wilcoxon signed rank test showed a significant
difference in the correctness of the assessment between the secure
and insecure passwords for the retention questionnaire (V = 129,
p = .002). An effect size of r = 0.462 indicates a medium effect.
7 DISCUSSION
The awareness-raising material was received positively by all par-
ticipating employees and addresses all attacks deemed relevant by
the literature and independent information security experts from
academia and industry. Table 1 summarises the results with re-
spect to all hypotheses in our analysis. It significantly increased
the participants’ ability to correctly assess the security of pass-
words. Moreover, it significantly increased the participants’ ability
to correctly assess whether password-related behaviour in different
information security scenarios known before reading through the
material is secure or insecure. The results regarding whether the
material improves the ability to correctly assess password-related
behaviour in previously unknown scenarios closely fail significance.
This again shows how difficult it is to develop effective awareness-
raising materials, even when following a thorough methodology
during their creation. Interestingly, the results of the retention show
that participants improved their ability to assess these scenarios.
This might indicate that our participants talked about the differ-
ent scenarios with colleagues also participating our study, that
they revisited the awareness-raising material, or that there was a
learning effect among the previously unknown scenarios where
the later seen scenarios in the post-treatment questionnaire helped
the participants to correctly assess other scenarios in the retention.
In the following, we will discuss first the improvements to the
awareness-raising material we could derive from the results of our
user study. Then, we discuss the limitations of this work.
7.1 Improvements Derived from the User Study
Despite the overall successful outcome of this work, we identify
four areas for further improvements.
Firstly, the poor performance of the participants with respect to
one of the scenarios (scenario 9) mandated a further improvement
to the awareness-raising material. Fortunately, the free text answers
offered an explanation for the poor performance and the respective
formulation in the material could be adapted. Due to the fact that
we wanted to leave it up to the participants whether or not to revisit
the material before the retention questionnaire, this correction is
not yet visible in the retention results. However, the corrections
were later made available to the participating employees.
Secondly, participants seemed to be hesitant to rate the security
of long passwords composed of multiple concatenated words cor-
rectly. In contrast, our participants could significantly better iden-
tify insecure passwords. This seems to indicate that our awareness-
raising material was more effective in improving the ability of the
participants to recognise insecure passwords than the ability to
recognise secure ones. Therefore, one focus of further improve-
ments must be the teaching of good creation strategies. As a first
step, we added additional explanations and examples to the respec-
tive sections of the material. Again, the additional explanations and
examples were only available to the participants after the retention.
Thirdly, the qualitative answers show that the participating em-
ployees desire additional concrete advice with respect to two as-
pects: (1) how to create secure passwords and (2) password man-
agers. The former should be addressed to some degree by the in-
formation added to the awareness-raising material as outlined in
the last paragraph. Yet, a section dedicated to password creation
strategies should be considered in future iterations of the material.
Need for the latter is also supported by the large number of partici-
pants who stated that they would start using a password manager
after having worked through the material. This is a positive effect,
as usage of password managers is widely considered a good advice
to users by information security experts [17, 28].
Lastly, the awareness-raising material currently includes only
the technologies: password managers, two-factor authentication,
fingerprint readers, graphical passwords, hardware tokens, privacy
filters, and single-sign-on. Future versions of the awareness-raising
material might need to include additional alternatives to text pass-
words should they gain widespread adoption (e.g. Face ID [1] or
palm vein authentication [3]).
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Despite the need for further improvements as outlined above, we
argue that this work can help create awareness-raising materials be-
yond the original application in the password context. The iterative
process used to create the password security awareness-raising ma-
terial could be easily applied to other information security contexts,
further contributing to the information security in organisations.
Therefore, applying the process in areas other than password secu-
rity represents one important line of future work.
7.2 Limitations
One limitation of our user study lies in the participant sample.
While the contact persons assured us that all participants would be
lay-users with respect to information security, we had to exclude
six participating employees, since their responses to the free text
answers indicated a thorough knowledge of information security.
Also, all participants are employed in German SMEs. Consequently,
it is unclear whether our findings fully translate to different groups
of users and to different countries. As future work, we plan to
validate our results in various contexts.
Following the recommendations of Haeussinger and Kranz [14],
we conducted the study in the real work environments of the par-
ticipating employees. The most reliable option in this regard would
have been tomonitor the password-related behaviour of the employ-
ees in their organisation and check whether the awareness-raising
material influences this behaviour. However, such a design has se-
vere issues in a real world setting in organisations: Gathering the
necessary data might pose security risks (e.g. passwords created by
the employees to see whether creation strategies change) or have
legal and privacy implications (e.g. surveilling employees at their
desks in order to see whether they store notes of passwords inse-
curely). Consequently, we chose a different study design, allowing
us to retain the anonymity and privacy of our participants as well
as avoid any security risks, while delivering the study materials
to the participants’ real work environments. However, this design
came with the trade-off that contact to the participants was only
possible through the contact persons. Thus, the study setting could
not be controlled. The participants were unsupervised throughout
all four phases of the study. Therefore, a number of limitations
arise: (a) participants might have used the material while filling out
the questionnaire, (b) participants might have filled out the post-
treatment questionnaire after reading the material only partially,
(c) participants who work in the same SME might have worked
(partially) together, and (d) participants might have spent very dif-
ferent amounts of time reading through the material which might
have impaired consistency not only between organisations, but
also between the participants of each organisation. To counteract
these issues, participants received instructions during each of the
four phases in our study. Participants were instructed to read the
awareness-raising material carefully and in its entirety. Also, they
were told that the post-treatment questionnaire would be sent out
only after they had explicitly acknowledged having read the entire
material. Last but not least, participants were instructed to fill out
the questionnaire by themselves.
Furthermore, only one of the three SMEs agreed to participate in
the retention after sixmonths. Concerns in the SMEs focusedmostly
on the potential impact on productivity, due to the participants
filling out the questionnaires in their working environment. This
was a huge factor deterring SMEs from participating in the study.
While addressing this issue is difficult, since thorough investigations
rely on thorough questionnaires, we advise any researcher planning
similar endeavours to consider this issue.
Another limitation relates to the baseline in our participant sam-
ple. Even before working through the material, over 88% of the
responses were correct. This might indicate (a) a methodological
problem resulting from misaligned difficulty levels of the scenarios
or (b) that the participants in our sample had already received edu-
cation with respect to password security before our study. Studies
with more difficult scenarios and different samples are needed to
investigate which of the two represents the cause for this issue.
Finally, we could not include a control condition in our study
design due to the limited amount of participants we could recruit in
the SMEs although this would have allowed us to present stronger
evidence with respect to the effectiveness of our awareness-raising
material.
8 CONCLUSION
In this work, we present a novel and systematically developed
awareness-raising material to make lay-users aware of attacks on
passwords and user accounts as well as the respective defences. We
developed this awareness-raising material in an iterative process. It
addresses all attacks deemed relevant by the literature and indepen-
dent information security experts from academia and industry. It
increases the participants’ ability to correctly assess (a) whether spe-
cific password-related behaviour in different information security
scenarios is secure or insecure and (b) the security of passwords. In
particular, these abilities are retained or even improved six months
after reading through the awareness-raising material. At the same
time, the awareness-raising material was received positively by all
participants.
The results of our study also point out areas for future work.
The participating employees expressed the desire to learn more
about password managers and the composition of secure passwords.
Thus, it might be warranted to create additional awareness-raising
materials for these topics. Also, it might be worthwhile to investi-
gate how to make the transition towards using a password manager
easier for users. Beyond the scope of password security, the iter-
ative process used to systematically create the awareness-raising
material presented in this work could easily be applied to other
information security contexts.
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF THE
AWARENESS-RAISING MATERIAL
The awareness-raising material ensures understandability for lay-
users by preventing technical terms, using simple language and
employing a wide range of examples. Due to space constraints it
is not possible to reproduce the full awareness-raising material
while retaining these measures. We can provide only a high-level
summary. However, the improved version of the awareness-raising
material can be freely accessed online2.
Accounting for the domain-knowledge of the readership of this
article, more technical terms are used in describing the content
of the awareness-raising material while also forgoing most of the
examples for the sake of brevity. The remainder of this section
reproduces the general structure of the awareness-raising material
and provides a short description of each section.
A.1 Introductory Sections
The awareness-raising material includes two introductory sections.
They give the users a short overview of (1) who might attack them
and where attacks can be targeted at and (2) the possible conse-
quences of successful attacks.
A.1.1 Possible Attackers. This section provides an overview of
possible attackers, including criminal hackers, social engineers at-
tempting to gain entry to a business facility, insider threats, spouses
and acquaintances, as well as employees of IT-service providers.
Next, it is explained where such attackers target their attacks, i.e.
the user itself, end devices, interactions with end devices, com-
munications between end-devices and services as well as only at
services.
A.1.2 Possible Consequences of Successful Attacks. Here, the
goals of attackers are discussed, thereby addressing the third rec-
ommendation of Tsohou et al. [30], i.e. emphasising consequences.
However, we carefully balanced this recommendation with their
2https://secuso.org/passwortsicherheit (in German only)
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first recommendation, focusing in our awareness-material on the
positive phrasing instead of risk and fear. The user is informed that
the primary goal of an attacker is not necessarily obtaining access
to a user’s account. Rather, attackers are interested in manipulating
an account for their specific gains. Examples include accessing the
victims email account in order to send phishing emails to the user’s
contacts, accessing cloud storage in order to blackmail the user, and
accessing the users bank account in order to withdraw funds.
A.2 Attacks
This section explains the different types of attacks. The description
of each attack comprises three parts: a general description of the
attack, a description of the defences, and (where necessary) further
hints which are only relevant for few users (e.g. hints for specific
software).
A.2.1 Attack: Fraudulent messages.
Description of Attack. The attacker sends a message encouraging
the victim to either provide user credentials, follow a link to a
malicious website or open a malicious attachment.
Description of Defences. Participants are encouraged to delete
messages identified as dangerous, verify both the sender as well as
the content regarding plausibility and analyse links and attachments
regarding whether they potentially represent a danger. Further,
the participant is referred to specific training material concerning
fraudulent messages [22].
Further Hints on the Attack. Interested participants are provided
with a link to a video explaining further details regarding fraudulent
messages [34]. The interested reader can find the video online3.
A.2.2 Attack: Theft of an insecurely stored note of the password.
Description of Attack. Attackers attempt to obtain credentials
stored physically in an insecure manner (e.g. a post-it under the
keyboard).
Description of Defences. Physical copies of passwords should be
stored securely.
Further Hints on the Attack. The participant is informed that
passwords transmitted via snail-mail are also subject to attack,
since they also represent a note of the password. Users should
be weary when passwords delivered via mail arrive in a damaged
envelope. In such cases they should be invalidated resent.
A.2.3 Attack: Shoulder-Surfing.
Description of Attack. The attacker watches the user entering his
or her passwords or unlock gestures either in person or via tools
such as cameras or infrared cameras.
Description of Defences. Participants are encouraged to ensure
that no third party can watch them while entering credentials.
Additionally, this risk can be mitigated by employing privacy filters
and cleaning touch screens.
3https://secuso.org/video-online-fraud
A.2.4 Attack: Compromising the user’s devices.
Description of Attack. The attacker attempts to compromise the
users device using malware, allowing the attacker to retrieve all
credentials used on the device. This might be attempted by obtain-
ing access to an unlocked and unobserved device or by tricking
the user into installing it, e.g. by accessing a website containing a
drive-by download. Users of mobile devices should be aware that
even Apps distributed via official App Stores may contain malware.
Description of Defences. Participants are encouraged to install
all relevant security patches for their devices, e.g. by enabling au-
tomatic updates, and to consider installing anti-virus software. In
addition, devices should be protected via a password (or an equiv-
alent authentication scheme using tokens or biometrics) and not
be left unattended. Further, full-disc encryption should be enabled.
Users are also advised to not connect external storage media from
unknown sources and to not install software from non-trusted
sources. Mobile devices should not be rooted or jailbroken.
Further Hints on the Attack. The interested participant is pro-
vided with further information regarding the dangers of rooting or
jailbeaking devices.
A.2.5 Attack: Eavesdropping on unencrypted communication.
Description of Attack. Attackers attempt to eavesdrop on unen-
crypted communication in order to obtain user credentials. This
is especially easy if unencrypted WiFi networks are used or the
authentication to a WiFi network occurs via an unencrypted con-
nection. Secondary credentials such as cookies which may be trans-
mitted via unencrypted channels may also be used by attackers to
access services.
Description of Defences. Participants are encouraged to ensure
that web-services are accessed via HTTPS connections and are
provided with identifying features of such connections. Further,
they are encouraged to logout from web-services after use in order
to invalidate secondary credentials.
Further Hints on the Attack. Links to additional information in
the form of videos and articles are provided to the user as well as
browser plug-ins which notify users of unencrypted connections.
A.2.6 Attack: Eavesdropping on encrypted communication.
Description of Attack. Attackers attempt to impersonate remote
services or perform a man-in-the-middle attack to intercept en-
crypted communication between the user and a service. Such at-
tacks render the encryption useless.
Description of Defences. Users are informed about the meaning of
browser warnings for insecure HTTPS connections. It is explained
how to identify low risk warnings (e.g. expired certificates). Partici-
pants are encouraged to attempt to establish a secure connection
from another device in order to verify that the same warning is
shown and contact the remote service if the error persists. Further,
participants are informed to never downgrade the HTTPS protocol
to HTTP as this would remove the encryption.
Further Hints on the Attack. In order to be able to detect relevant
encryption related browser warnings, participants are presented
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with screenshots and explanations pertaining to all major current
browsers.
A.2.7 Attack: Targeted guessing.
Description of Attack. In this approach attackers attempt to gain
access to one specific user account by attempting to authenticate
using likely passwords associated with the user. Sources for such
passwords are for example social media or other public sources of
information, such as company websites.
Description of Defences. Participants are encouraged to select
passwords which cannot be associated with their person, by not
incorporating information about them which is publicly available.
When passwords are supposed to protect against spouses or close
acquaintances, user are advised to consider what the respective
person could deduce as password guess.
A.2.8 Attack: Untargetted guessing.
Description of Attack. In untargeted guessing scenarios, attack-
ers attempt to obtain credentials for many user accounts at one
specific service in parallel, i.e. trawling attacks [6]. Frequently used
passwords (such as keyboard walks), passwords from past breaches,
and dictionary words of a variety of languages are used as guesses
for all known user accounts at the service under attack. This attack
requires knowledge of valid usernames for the service, which are
often publicly accessible (e.g. on sites where users post content,
such as online forums) or available for purchase on the black market
(e.g. for email services).
Description of Defences. This attack can be prevented by choosing
infrequently used passwords, which also are not related to the
service they are used for.
A.2.9 Attack: Guessing after a break-in.
Description of Attack. In this attack scenario an attacker has
already compromised a service and obtained the stored credentials.
If the credentials are stored as hashes usually a combination of
brute-force and dictionary attacks are used in this case.
Description of Defences. Defence against this attack is two-part.
First, service operators need to observe security best-practices,
otherwise, all user efforts are in vain [11]. Second, participants are
encouraged to select long passwords, especially for device login,
password manager master-passwords, email account passwords,
and single-sign-on passwords.
Further Hints on the Attack. Re-using passwords for multiple
services increases the likelihoods of success of this attack.
A.2.10 Attack: Theft of unencrypted digital password notes.
Description of Attack. This attack targets credentials stored un-
encrypted on systems, physical media or in the cloud.
Description of Defences. The user is encouraged to store pass-
words only encrypted, i.e. to use a password manager, in particular
when passwords are synchronised between multiple devices. If
sharing a password is required in an emergency, transmission of
the encrypted password should occur via encrypted channels if
possible. Then, after the emergency-use of the password is finished,
the password should be changed.
Further Hints on the Attack. Passwords which are sent to the user
unencrypted, e.g. as replacement during a password reset, should
be changed as soon as possible.
A.2.11 Attack: Exploiting a weak reset mechanism.
Description of Attack. This attack attempts to exploit week pass-
word reset mechanisms, allowing an attacker to change an account’s
password to a password known to him or her. This attack allows
attackers to bypass even strong passwords.
Description of Defences. Defence against this attack depends on
the type of password reset mechanism employed by the service. If
password reset is based on the user’s email address, a secure pass-
word for the email account must be ensured. If security questions
are used as reset mechanism, it must be ensured that the answers
to the security questions cannot be guessed. One possible solution
is to treat the answers to security questions as passwords and store
them in a password manager.
A.3 Technologies to Protect User Credentials
In order to mitigate the attacks described in the previous section,
multiple technologies are available to users. For each introduced
technology, first a general description is provided. Then, advantages
and disadvantages of the technology are listed. Last but not least,
where available, additional hints are provided to the participant.
A.3.1 Technology: Fingerprint Readers.
Description of the Technology. Fingerprint readers can be used to
replace regular passwords with a biometric feature.
Advantages and disadvantages of the technology. On the one hand,
using fingerprint readers is faster than entering passwords and also
prevents shoulder surfing. On the other hand, photos or fingerprints
taken from touched surfaces might be used to copy fingerprints.
Further, changing ones fingerprints is not possible, if they are com-
promised.
Hints for using fingerprint readers. Fingerprint readers are read-
ily available in a large variety of new consumer products. Some
implementations can be used to replace large sets of different types
of passwords (e.g. when the fingerprint is used to unlock a pass-
word manager or system keychain). Other biometric sensors in
consumer products, such as face detection, might not be as mature
and therefore not as secure.
A.3.2 Technology: Graphical Passwords.
Description of the Technology. Graphical passwords are used to
replace text passwords or PINs and consist of graphical informa-
tion. Examples include the Android pattern lock or the graphical
password of the Windows operating system. Graphical passwords
do not change the security level when compared to text passwords.
Advantages and disadvantages of the technology. Graphical pass-
words can be easier remembered by humans, however entry may
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take longer allowing attackers more time to observe the entry. Fur-
thermore, graphical passwords are incompatible with password
managers.
Hints for using graphical passwords. If services allow for the use
of graphical passwords, they usually can be used in conjunction
with traditional text passwords. Similarly to text passwords, it is
also possible to choose weak graphical passwords. Examples include
symmetric patterns or clickable locations which are faces of persons,
red items or corners and centres of items.
A.3.3 Technology: Hardware Tokens.
Description of the Technology. Hardware tokens can replace text
passwords as authentication mechanisms. Examples for hardware
tokens include USB devices, smartwatches and special chip cards.
Advantages and disadvantages of the technology. Hardware to-
kens prevent shoulder surfing and increase the difficulty of guessing
attacks. However, if the token is stolen, the thief can authenticate
using the token.
Hints for using hardware tokens. In the business context, the
integration of hardware tokens should be coordinated with the IT
department. Many hardware tokens can also be used as part of two
factor authentication.
A.3.4 Technology: Password Manager.
Description of the Technology. Password managers support users
in creating and storing secure passwords. They are available for
many mobile and desktop platforms, some allow the synchroni-
sation between different devices. Many security professionals use
password managers, as they are an effective tool to prevent many
of the attacks explained earlier.
Advantages and disadvantages of the technology. Password man-
agers create secure, long passwords defending against guessing at-
tacks. The use of browser plugins which allow auto-fill of passwords
on websites for which passwords were previously stored, prevent
phishing and shoulder surfing attacks. In most cases the secure
usage of a password manager requires a strong master-password.
If the master-password is lost, access to the stored passwords may
become impossible.
Hints for using password managers. Selection of a password man-
ager should consider the users requirements, for example if a browser
plugin is required. Users should select a password manager which
can also generate secure passwords. Securemaster passwords should
be selected, for example by concatenating multiple words. Weak
legacy passwords (i.e. not generated using the password manager)
should be replaced with stronger passwords when added to the
password manager. New passwords for services should be created
using the password managers password generator functionality.
A.3.5 Technology: Privacy filters.
Description of the Technology. Privacy filters can be used to pre-
vent shoulder surfing by restricting the viewable angle of screens.
This reduces the risk posed by observers behind or next to the user,
for example while travelling via train.
Advantages and disadvantages of the technology. Privacy filters
reduce the risk of shoulder surfing, however they may reduce the
brightness of screens and the sensitivity of touch input.
Hints for using privacy filters. Depending on the user’s device,
different types of privacy filter may be required. In enterprise envi-
ronments the use of privacy filters should be coordinated with the
IT department.
A.3.6 Technology: Single-Sign-On.
Description of the Technology. Single-sign-on technologies allow
users to authenticate to one service, which in turn confirms the
identity and authenticity of the user to other services. This tech-
nology is common in enterprise environments but also available in
private settings. If single-sign-on is used, the selection of a strong
password for the identity provider is especially important.
Advantages and disadvantages of the technology. Single-sign-on
solutions reduce the number of passwords and authentications
required. Furthermore, single-sign on allows sharing of data associ-
ated to user accounts between the single-sign-on service and other
services (and it thus does not have to be entered on each service
individually, saving time during registration). As the other services
require no password, guessing attacks and password attacks are not
possible. However, the single-sign-on service is able to store infor-
mation about services used by the user which might incur privacy
issues. Additionally, the single-sign-on service represents a remote
single point of failure. If the single-sign-on service experiences an
outage, no authentication to the associated services is possible. If
it is compromised, all accounts connected to the single-sign-on
service are compromised as well.
Hints for using single-sign-on. The user is provided with an exam-
ple of setting up a single-sign-on authentication using as example
a popular webservice.
A.3.7 Technology: Two-factor authentication.
Description of the Technology. Two-factor authentication requires
authentication using different factors, such as something you know,
something you are or something you have.
Advantages and disadvantages of the technology. Two-factor au-
thentication ensures that an attacker cannot access an account
even if the users password is compromised, increasing the security
level significantly. Two-factor authentication is recommended as
an easy way to increase the security of important accounts such
as the primary email address to which password reset emails are
delivered. However, if two-factor authentication is used, all factors
are required in order to authenticate. If the second factor is lost,
restoring access requires more effort than a traditional password
reset.
Hints for using two-factor authentication. Today, many services
allow users to enable two-factor authentication. If different types
of factors are available, the use of SMS authentication should be
avoided [13].
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Table 2: APPENDIX B: This table lists all scenarios used in the study. Since we conducted our study in Germany, the scenarios
were originally developed and used in German and translated for this publication. For each attack there are two scenarios, one
representing secure behaviour and one representing insecure behaviour.
Attack # Scenario
Fr
au
du
le
nt
m
es
sa
ge
s
Se
cu
re
1 Mr. Schmidt works together with his colleague Müller on the same project. Mr. Schmidt is the vacation substitution
for his colleague. He receives an email in which his colleague asks him to send the project plan to his private email
address, because he wants to work on it in his rainy vacation. Mr. Schmidt does not send the information to the
private email address.
In
se
cu
re
2 Mr. Schmidt’s boss is on a business trip to visit a client. Mr. Schmidt receives an email in which his boss informs him
that a person from the help desk of the client will contact Mr. Schmidt to get access to the web-interface of the project
management software. Shortly after, Mr. Schmidt’s phone rings: it is the person from the help desk. Since he received
the announcement of the call from the email-address of his boss, Mr. Schmidt gives the person from the help desk the
required password.
Th
ef
to
fa
n
in
se
-
cu
re
ly
st
or
ed
no
te
of
th
e
pa
ss
w
or
d
Se
cu
re 3 Mr. Schmidt finds it difficult to remember his passwords. Therefore, he keeps a note of his private passwords at home
in a locked drawer of his desk, which only he can open.
In
se
cu
re 4 Mr. Schmidt has to change the password for one system in the company every 90 days. He already had to call thehelp desk of his company multiple times to have them reset a pass-word he could not remember after a mandatory
change. When changing the password for the next time, he makes a note of it and stores the note under his mousepad
on his desk.
Sh
ou
ld
er
-s
ur
fin
g Se
cu
re
5 Mr. Schmidt sits in the train on his way to a client. The train is fully booked, the seat next to him taken. Mr. Schmidt
checks emails using his smartphone. Due to an urgent request from his boss, he has to access the web-interface of the
project management software used in this company to list a cost report. He notices that the person in the seat next to
him tries to look at the screen of his smartphone inconspicuously. Therefore, he leaves his seat and moves to an area
in the train where he is undisturbed, so that no one can spy on the sensitive data he is accessing.
In
se
cu
re
6 Mr. Schmidt is sitting in a café and waits on his colleague to have lunch together. Since his colleague sent him a text
message saying that he will be 30 minutes late, Mr. Schmidt wants to use the time to work on his laptop. While he is
working a couple approaches and asks whether they can join him at the table. Since all other tables in the café are
fully occupied, Mr. Schmidt agrees. One of them sits down on the opposing side of the table, one sits down next to Mr.
Schmidt who continues his work and logs in multiple times to the web-interface of the project management software
of his company.
Co
m
pr
om
isi
ng
th
e
us
er
s’
de
vi
ce
s
Se
cu
re 7 Mr. Schmidt sits in his office. He is printing presentation slides for a meeting. The printer is located at the other end
of the corridor. Before Mr. Schmidt leaves his desk to fetch the print-out, he locks his laptop.
In
se
cu
re 8 Mr. Schmidt has to share a file with this colleague Mr. Müller. The file is too large to attach it to an email. Since he has
no USB stick at hand, he uses the one he found last week in the parking lot of his company.
Ea
ve
sd
ro
pp
in
g
on
un
en
cr
yp
te
d
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n
Se
cu
re 9 Mr. Schmidt is on his way to a client. Unfortunately, the train is delayed. Therefore, he sits down in a café at the train
station. There he uses an open wifi. He uses his laptop as usual, but pays attention that he visits all websites using an
encrypted connection.
In
se
cu
re 10 Mr. Schmidt is on a business trip visiting a client in a different city. There he stays in a hotel and uses its charged
premium unencrypted wifi to work in his room. To login to the wifi, he has to enter a user name and a password.
Ea
ve
sd
ro
pp
in
g
on
en
cr
yp
te
d
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n
Se
cu
re 11 Mr. Schmidt has to access the web-interface of a client’s system. He receives a warning that no encrypted connection
is possible although this has worked in the past. Therefore, Mr. Schmidt calls the client using a phone number known
to him, describing the problem. He does not access the web-interface until the problem is solved.
In
se
cu
re
12 Mr. Schmidt is at a client in a different city to prepare a new project. He has to stay several nights and books a room
in a hotel. Once he is in his room, he tries to access the web-interface of the project management software of his
company. He receives a warning stating there is problem with the security of the connection, although the connection
is encrypted. The problem does not occur with the web-interface of his email account. He infers that the web-interface
of the project management software is misconfigured and enters his credentials.
Continued on next page
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
Attack # Scenario
Ta
rg
et
ed
gu
es
sin
g
Se
cu
re
13 Mr. Schmidt takes his private smartphone to work (but does not use it for business purposes). He does not want that
friends or colleagues can access the phone by guessing his PIN. Since he shares the phone with his wife in their
free-time, she should be able to easily re-member the PIN. Therefore Mr. Schmidt uses as PIN the birthday of the
family dog, which is only known to him and his wife.
In
se
cu
re 14 Mr. Schmidt finds it difficult to remember passwords. Therefore, he uses as password for his laptop at work Alexan-
der1997, the first name and the year of birth of his child.
Un
ta
rg
et
ed
gu
es
sin
g
Se
cu
re
15 Mr. Schmidt has to perform small design tasks. For this purpose, he has to open an account with Adobe to purchase and
download software such as Photoshop and InDesign. For the user account, he chooses a long password (substantially
longer than 8 characters), which is neither in the lists of frequently chosen passwords nor derived from the company
name Adobe.
In
se
cu
re 16 Mr. Schmidt has problems remembering all the passwords he needs for his job and privately. Therefore, he uses walks
on the keyboard, such as 1q2w3e4r%, to create secure passwords.
Gu
es
sin
g
af
te
r
a
br
ea
k-
in Se
cu
re 17 Mr. Schmidt is frequently on business trips and once he had his laptop almost stolen at the airport. Therefore, he
encrypts its hard drive and chooses to encrypt the hard drive and to login a password with more than 20 characters
which he creates concatenating multiple words to one another.
In
se
cu
re 18 The company in which Mr. Schmidt is employed uses an external web service to store important client data. Mr.Schmidt learns that this web service was the target of a successful hacker attack and that password data was stolen.
His password is Al3xand3r!, derived from the name of his son. Since the password is longer than 8 characters and
contains multiple numbers and a symbol he does not change it.
Th
ef
to
fa
n
un
en
-
cr
yp
te
d
di
gi
ta
ln
ot
e
of
th
e
pa
ss
w
or
d
Se
cu
re
19 Since Mr. Schmidt has problems remembering the many passwords he needs for his job, he asks the it-department
whether they can install a password manager on his work laptop. Since he wants to synchronise the passwords to his
business smartphone, he chooses a master password with more than 20 characters, which he creates by concatenating
multiple words.
In
se
cu
re 20 Mr. Schmidt has to use many passwords in his daily job to log on to all the different systems needs to access. Since he
also works on his business smartphone, Mr. Schmidt saves all the passwords in a Word document and synchronises
this document through a public third-party cloud storage provider between his laptop and his smartphone.
Ex
pl
oi
tin
g
a
w
ea
k
re
se
t-m
ec
ha
ni
sm
Se
cu
re 21 Mr. Schmidt uses different external web services, as is usual in his company. For one of the web services, the password
can be reset using personal security questions. Instead of answering the questions truthfully, Mr. Schmidt chooses a
random character sequence as answers, writes this sequence down, and stores it where only he can access it.
In
se
cu
re 22 Mr. Schmidt uses different web services in his private life. For one of the web services the password can be reset usinga link in an email sent to him. As password for the respective email account he chooses @lex@nder1997 (derived
from the first name and year of birth of his son), since it is more than 8 characters long and contains multiple special
characters.
